THE
ROUNDTABLE FORUM
Official newsletter of the Battle of Midway Roundtable
4 September
2009
Issue
Number: 2009-34
Our 12th Year
~
AROUND THE TABLE ~
MEMBERS’
TOPICS IN THIS ISSUE:
1. Who Originated the “Midway Has No Water” Ruse?
2. A Dawn Like Thunder
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1. WHO ORIGINATED THE “MIDWAY HAS
NO WATER” RUSE?
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29 August 2009
From: Ronald Martell
Florida
Regarding
the mystery of who really came up with the idea of having Midway report its water
condenser problem: I have seen
references to Layton, Rochefort and Jasper Holmes as being the originator
of the ruse. I suspect that Holmes is
the correct answer but do not know.
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Ed. note: I responded to Ron that HYPO’s
second-in-command Jasper Holmes credits Japanese language officer Joseph
Finnegan with the initial suggestion that bogus intel could be fed to the
Japanese, which HYPO would then intercept when the news was reported to Tokyo
(see Holmes’ book, Double-Edged Secrets, p. 90-91). But since that conversation had occurred at
the desk of Ensign Mac Showers who remembers the discussion vividly (see No
Right to Win, p. 34-35), I asked him for his input. His position has always been that credit for
the water ruse should go to Holmes himself.
Here is Mac’s reply to Ron’s question, and this is actually two messages
merged into one:
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30 August 2009
From: RADM D. M. (Mac)
Showers, USN-Ret
Virginia
BOM vet, intel analyst, Combat Intel Unit (HYPO), Pearl Harbor
Remembering this event as if it happened yesterday, let me recount in
detail just what happened, and then some further comments of my own.
I was sitting at my desk and Jasper Holmes was standing beside it
talking with me when Rochefort approached and said, "Jasper, we've got to
do something to prove to the world that AF is Midway." Jasper responded, "I've been thinking
about that, and here's my suggestion." (Jasper then outlines his
story, including the fact of a cable connection to Midway.) At the end of
his suggestion, Rochefort said, "Very good, Jasper, very
good." (Very genuine high praise from Rochefort!)
If Finnegan, Ham Wright, or anyone else was present, I don't
recall. One or both of them may have walked up, because it always
attracted attention when Rochefort was conducting a "huddle."
But, if present, they certainly did not contribute to the
scenario.
Rochefort then went to his secure telephone to Layton [CINCPAC staff intel
officer and Rochefort’s interface with Nimitz] and recounted the idea.
Soon afterward, Rochefort received permission from Layton to proceed with the
plan. The “Midway has no water” message
was prepared, and Rochefort took it to COM14 because it had to go over their
communications system, and they certainly needed and deserved an explanation of
what was involved.
If Finnegan had noted something about the Japanese on Wake intercepting
it, that must have occurred separately, because I was never aware of the Wake
role until the following day when the intercept arrived.
About 9:00 AM the following morning, Finnegan translated the message
from Wake, and expressions of satisfaction reverberated throughout HYPO.
At that point, Rochefort told all hands, "Let's just sit on this for a
while to see if anyone else (Melbourne or Washington) comes through with
it." This was typical of Rochefort, whose motto was, "We can do
anything so long as one doesn't worry about who gets the
credit.") Within an hour thereafter, Melbourne did send the
same message [their intercept of the Japanese “Midway has no water”
transmission] on the COPEK circuit, which served to put it in the hands of
Washington without HYPO having to appear self-serving.
I believe Rochefort did call Layton with the results while awaiting the
Melbourne input. After all, so far as we were concerned, this was simply
confirmation of what we had believed all along. Washington was the
doubter.
I have been told that after the Midway plain language report was
received by COM14, a fresh water tanker was ordered to replenish Midway's water
supply. This was also ordered by plain language message, but I don't
think the tanker ever sailed. This follow-up action, I would suggest, was
probably the cooperative effort of COM14 to give validity to the ruse.
Holmes, in his book, fails to take the credit he deserves for his
role. I have always believed that this was due to his wish to not further
upset Layton. Layton and Holmes were professional adversaries.
Layton and Rochefort were best buddies, and Layton was jealous of Rochefort's
close association with Holmes. (I could
write at length on the subject of this relationship.)
Layton, in his book And I
Was There, gave total credit for this action to Rochefort with no mention
of Holmes. That was in Layton's notes and was included in the original
draft of his book as written by Roger Pineau and John Costello.
However, the co-authors had engaged me to assist them as they wrote the book
after Layton's death, and this is one fact on which I insisted they make a
correction, which they did. Originally, they had written (Layton speaking) "Rochefort
came up with the idea," whereupon I told them the same story I recited to
you, and they agreed to make a change.
So, Layton's book does
correctly attribute the genesis of the plan to Holmes.
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Ed note: once again, we are indebted to one of our
Midway vets for exclusive insight that gives a more accurate view of an aspect
of the battle than you’ll find in some of its respected histories. Like George Gay, Holmes wrote his book 37
years after the BOM, and it’s fair to speculate that his recall of some of its
details across that span of time might not have been perfect in every
case. Plus, as Mac suggests, Holmes may
have been a bit modest in spreading credit for the crucial water ruse ploy
among others.
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2. A DAWN LIKE THUNDER ( see issue # 2009-01 )
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3 September 2009
From: Nancy Mahi
Oregon
For some time I've been meaning
to throw in my two cents about Robert Mrazek's A Dawn Like Thunder,
which is one of the best books I've read about the BOM. I like the way the book is set up, and his
writing style makes the book very readable, rather like a
fast-paced novel.
Mr. Mrazek clearly did
extensive research, particularly with interviews of veterans, and that added
immensely to the book. I'm probably
prejudiced because my uncle was one the pilots profiled, but I also appreciated
that the author followed the men of VT-8 after the BOM. Sometimes people forget that Torpedo Eight
did not end at Midway. The men who
had been part of it continued to serve with distinction throughout the
war, and several made a career of the Navy. I have been to two VT-8 reunions in the past several years, and
they are the finest group of men it's been my pleasure to meet. It was gratifying to see them recognized in
this book.
I also appreciated that Mr.
Mrazek didn't sugar-coat his findings.
He told the truth and that's the way it should be. The book is readable, informative, and fair. I highly recommend it to any Roundtable
members who haven't yet read it.
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Ed. note: Nancy’s uncle, TBD pilot Grant Teats, flew
with Waldron from the Hornet at the BOM.
~ NOW
HEAR THIS! ~
NEWS
& INFO IN THIS ISSUE:
- Remembering Bob Hendrick
- Link of the Week
- Editor’s Notes
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REMEMBERING BOB
HENDRICK
Sixth Marine Defense Battalion veteran
John Gardner reports that Robert E. Hendrick, a fellow 6th MDB vet and
long-time Roundtable member, departed for his last muster on February 27th of
this year.
Bob joined the Corps in
1939. After boot camp he had the good
fortune to be assigned to sea school, which trained him for duty with a
shipboard Marine detachment. He was
assigned to the battleship USS Idaho, which he recalled fondly. The Idaho transferred from the
Atlantic to the Pacific Fleet, and Bob especially remembered the grand times he
had during the 1939 World’s Fair at San Francisco.
The Idaho went to Pearl
Harbor when the Pacific Fleet was homeported there in 1940. In April 1941 he was transferred to the
newly-formed 6th MDB at San Diego, which was slated to relieve the 1st MDB on
Wake Island. However, the 6th was
redirected to Midway, and Bob arrived there on September 22nd. Because of his experience on the five-inch
guns of the Idaho, he was assigned to Battery “B” on Eastern Island,
which had the same type of gun.
Midway was expected to be an
element of a big fleet exercise around the end of the year. When Bob returned from a Sunday stroll
around the island on the morning of December 7th and found everyone in full
battle gear at the guns, he thought “man, they’re really playing up that big
exercise.” As the day wore on, rumors
abounded concerning sunken ships at Pearl.
The Marines made bets with each other as to whether it was real or just
part of the exercise. All bets were
settled that night when two Japanese destroyers began to bombard the
atoll. Bob was the trainer (azimuth
operator) on one of the guns, and the battery was credited with two possible
hits on one of the enemy ships.
Bob’s principal memory of the
BOM was the Japanese bomb that hit the new PX, which drenched him with a
downpour of beer and soft drinks. He
was promoted to sergeant after the battle, and transferred out of Midway in
April 1943 for assignment to Field Artillery Ordnance School, then to the newly
formed 5th Marine Division. The
division put out to sea with a huge fleet early in 1945 without the Marines
being told where they were going. They
soon found out as Iwo Jima came into view.
Bob went ashore on the fifth day as an ordnance chief with the 13th
Artillery Regiment. His unit escaped Iwo
with few casualties, unlike the calamity suffered by the Marine infantry
regiments.
The 5th Division was training
for the invasion of Japan when the war ended in September. After a few months of occupation duty,
Gunnery Sgt. Hendricks returned home and left the Corps in 1947 after eight
years of service. He studied business
in college and soon began a long career in the newspaper industry, from which
he retired in 1982. For many years he
was well known among his fellow Marine vets for his tireless efforts in
connection with annual MDB reunions and in editing and producing an association
newsletter.
Farewell and following seas to a fine Roundtable vet and
honored Midway Marine.
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LINK OF THE WEEK
Here’s a good collection of USS Hornet photos from
the NavSource web site. Several of the
more familiar images are included, but there are many that will be new to a lot
of our members.
Click
here for the link of the week
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EDITOR’S NOTES
For a glossary of abbreviations, acronyms, and terms used in The
Roundtable Forum, click here
or go to our home page and click "The Roundtable Glossary" link.
Unless otherwise noted, all
original content in this issue of The Roundtable Forum, the Official
Newsletter of the Battle of Midway Roundtable is copyright 2009 by Ronald
W. Russell (see the “About
the BOMRT” page). Permission to
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