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Seven to nine airplanes were shot down by anti-aircraft fire. I saw one hit on a formation of horizontal bombers - 3" anti-aircraft. Six of them were coming over San Island. They released their bombs for San Island, then a A.A. connected with one of them. He made a big, bright flash in the sky, fell off, burned for four or five seconds and went into the water in a trail of smoke. The rest of them didn't break formation - they turned away in what appeared to be a leisurely fashion. They were pretty high.

One or two pilots reported they had a twin-engine bomber along, but I didn't see it. Captain White of the fighter squadron reported he had run into one twin-engine bomber. Also there was a report that two pilots had run into what appeared to be a Messerschmidt type, but other reports made it a type Zero that is liquid-collid.

Prior to the attack we got our aircraft crews and the ground personnel of the aviation organization together and organized them into two companies to use as reserves, in case it was necessary to aid in repelling the landing attack.

Communication circuits, telephone and, so far as we could, the radio, has been paralleled, and the actual lines separated from one another as much as possible, so that, if one was shot out we could plug over into the other line and still have communication. After the first few bombs landed all communications with the other island, where the commanding officer of the air station was located, and his special assistants who had been sent out there, went out except what was known as the seaphone. For some time, until the latter part of the day of the attack, that's all the communication we had with them. We also had that doubled, with two seaphones.

Previous to the attack we thought the Japs would undoubtedly resort to jamming our radio, as the frequency had been used for some time and we thought it was well known to them. So we set up a table of four or five alternate frequencies and declared radio silence when we put one of those frequencies on. We did this four or five days before the attack. If radio silence was violated because of an emergency, we immediately shifted to another frequency that hadn't been used in the area. In order to keep up deception, we took our radio logs for two months back and shuffled them and had a man on duty at the proper time of day at odd intervals read a passage or two from this log onto the air to make it appear that everything was operating normally and that we were on a normal frequency band.

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