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The Battle of Midway Roundtable Opening Remarks
Now in our 17th year! Pretty amazing. So much credit has to be given to those who started the RoundTable and to those veterans that contributed in the past and those that continue to contribute. There are simply not enough words to thank them enough.
This month we have a discussion of the quality of Japanese Navy Pilots at the time of The Battle of Midway as well as the number of aircraft carried between the Pearl Harbor attack and Midway. One member remembers meeting Helmuth Hoerner, a comment on the possibility of AP bombs being used at Midway as well as another comment on the Norden Bombsight and Mr. Ron Russell gives us his reply to the suggestion that the Enterprise Dive Bombers might have missed Kido Butai due to Nagumo's Turn.
And last Paul Corio has launched a Kickstarter page for his project 'Charge of the Devastators'. Give it a look.
Turnover of Japanese navy pilots before the BOM
From Ron Martell:
A re-reading the Japanese Story of the Battle of Midway, disclosed what seems to be an historical inconsistency. Histories of the Battle generally hold that the battle did not significantly reduce the number of experienced carrier pilots. Some texts state first-line pilots were not rotated back to Japan to train student pilots. Pilots flew until killed or wounded to the point of ineffectiveness.
In the Japanese Story of the Battle of Midway, [paragraph 3 under Preparations for the Operation] Admiral Nagumo’s report says:
Although the flight training program was conducted without any major incident, since there had been a considerable turn-over in personnel, practically no one got beyond the point of basic training. Inexperienced fliers barely got to the point where they could make daytime landings on carriers. It was found that even some of the more seasoned fliers had lost some of their skill.* (My emphasis)
Are there sources of information that touch on some of the questions this passage raises?
- How many pilots were there in the “considerable turnover”and what experience did they have?
- Was Nagumo correct in stating that few of the new pilots were beyond “basic training” or was he attempting to find an excuse for the loss of his carriers?
- The factor most often cited as the reason the Japanese lost four carriers stemmed from Zeros chasing torpedo planes at low altitude when the dive bombers went to work. Were the Zeros disproportionately flown by less experienced pilots or were the new pilots flying other types?
- Was there a disproportionate percentage of the new pilots on any specific carrier(s)?
- Before the BOM was the Japanese navy in fact scraping lower down in the barrel for pilots?
Mark Peattie wrote in his book Sunburst, the Rise of Japanese Air Power, at page 134, “. . . [I]n late 1941 the Japanese navy had on hand probably not much more than nine hundred outstanding pilots—mostly on carriers—out of a total of around thirty-five hundred.” (His emphasis) At page 332 n. 13, Peattie said James Sawruk, in a private letter, had estimated there were nine hundred carrier pilots without describing the level of their experience. Craig Symonds points out at pp. 40-42 how few pilots the Japanese navy turned out during the 1930s and early 1940s. In round numbers Japan needed roughly 600 to 625 pilots for the ten carriers it had plus the Hiyo that would launch soon. Replacing the losses from Pearl Harbor and Coral Sea may have required an additional 120 to 160 or so. Some of Japan's first-line pilots had to have been instructors or held staff
positions. It is possible that Japan did not have 900 well-qualified carrier pilots to choose from.
While texts often stress the quality of Japanese navy pilots remained high after Midway, with the loss of four carriers and roughly 250 planes, the loss of 100 to 110 pilots would have left a surplus of more experienced pilots occupying fewer cockpit seats. I would very much appreciate any information or citation to sources that bear on these questions.
Ron Martell
* From the Japanese Story of the Battle of Midway
Under 3. Preparations for the operation
http://www.history.navy.mil/library/special/midway.htm#p1
------------------------------------------------ From Jon Parshall;
As to pilot quality, check pp. 87-90 ( Shattered Sword). To wit:
"Nagumo’s comments regarding his aviators are further laid bare by a detailed examination of the composition of his air group personnel in June 1942. Fully 70 percent of the pilots in Kidō Butai ’s four dive-bomber units were Pearl Harbor veterans. The situation in the kankō groups was even better, with 85 percent of the pilots being Pearl Harbor alumni. Every single pilot in Akagi ’s kankōtai had been with the ship in December 1941. Furthermore, many of the new pilots in the air groups were senior petty officers who had most likely been culled out of shoreside training commands and other billets. Thus, even the replacement aviators very often also were experienced men. Furthermore, they had been introduced into the air units in dribs and drabs over the course of the previous six months, meaning that they had had plenty of time to adjust to their units and get to know their shipmates."
"It is true that the aircrews may have been employing their weapons less frequently, particularly their torpedoes. For instance, it is unlikely that any of CarDiv 1’s or 2’s kankō squadrons had dropped a torpedo in anger against an enemy target since Pearl Harbor. It is possible, therefore, that torpedo proficiency in the kankōtai may have been reduced. Yet, this was but one index of air group readiness. And in a broader sense the evidence seems to indicate that the aircrews still retained proficiency in the employment of their ordnance. In the Indian Ocean, the dive-bombers had demonstrated on two separate occasions that they were perfectly capable of attacking fast-moving warships. Even the relatively junior carriers of CarDiv 5 had performed credibly during the recent battles in the Coral Sea. It is hard, therefore, to discredit the quality of the aviators in any of Japan’s fleet carrier divisions at this point in the war. Thus, in the final analysis, the comments in Nagumo’s
report must be taken with a large grain of salt."
Bottom line: I don't buy it. These were highly experienced squadrons. Yeah, some of the replacements may not have been as sharp, but they were hardly rookies. Likewise, you'll note that throughout the battle, at the tactical level, the Japanese aircrew displayed a *very* high level of professionalism. Kobayashi's attack was brilliant; so was Tomonaga's. I think Nagumo's basically lookin' for excuses.
As for the notion that Nagumo held back the A-team as reserve, I think that's basically correct. You had Egusa in reserve on Soryu, the best dive-bomber pilot in the fleet. And over on Akagi you had Murata Shigeharu, who was basically the top torpedo attack leader. I talk about this a little on pp. 131-132. But the other squadrons used during the morning -- Tomonaga et. al., were all very good as well. At this point in the war, Kido Butai was a very, very capable outfit.
------------------------------------------------ Editor's Reply:
My recollections are that Nagumo was only talking about the replacement pilots that were being assigned to the Carrier air groups. The Japanese went to war with only about 100 reserve pilots of the skill level of the first line pilots in the Navy. From Pearl Harbor to Midway the Japanese conducted many raids and aircraft and pilots were lost, the bulk at Coral Sea, but that did not really affect the 4 carriers at Midway to any degree but they did still need some replacements.
The Vals from Carrier division 2 (Hiryu and Soryu) were largely thought of as the best in the Navy and were largely intact at the time of Midway. The torpedo bombers from Akagi and Kaga were made up of the bulk of the experienced torpedo pilots. Nagumo did hold those pilots (his best from what he says) in reserve to attack any US ships that might be discovered. And all one has to do is look at Hiryu's strike on the Yorktown to see that they were still very good.
It appears that there was significantly less turnover than Nagumo claimed. Perhaps he was out of touch but that is hard to imagine. According to some reports there were as few as 4 or 5 new pilots in some of the squadrons. There was a gentleman that did considerable research on the subject, James Sawruk. He has apparently researched the squadrons pilot by pilot and seems very few of the pilots were new to the squadrons and really most were pulled from senior pilots with a lot of experience so their quality cannot be questioned that much. *See the chart at the bottom of this article for pilots and losses.
What is much more telling is aircraft complements themselves. The carriers did not carry the same number of aircraft as at Pearl Harbor, maybe by design but more likely as a result of losses suffered and aircraft being returned to squadrons they were borrowed from. So maybe the quality and pilot number did not go down so much as they just didn't have the same number. If you look at the carrier complements of the Pearl Harbor attack and then at the Midway and Coral Sea battles you can see some squadrons reduced from 27 to 18 aircraft.
I think the statements made are accurate if he is talking about the replacement pilots and really only talking about carrier opts. Remember this book was translated from Japanese so not sure how much was lost in translation.
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Mr. Martell replies:
Thank you very much for your email and the information. I have attached two charts to show the number of planes flown by carrier at Pearl Harbor, Coral Sea, and Midway. There were a total of 53 fewer planes flown at Midway and 17 fewer at Coral Sea than at Pearl Harbor, for a total of 70 fewer planes. I assume that there were then 70 fewer "new" [i.e. non-Pearl Harbor] pilots in the two battles. Some of the pilots may have stocked the 48 planes aboard the Junyo bound for the Aleutians and some may have been attached to the 6th Kokutai which furnished 21 fighters intended for Midway and 9 more for the Aleutians.
Taking the percentages of non-Pearl Harbor pilots from Jon Parshall, (30% of 70 dive bombers and 15% of 81 attack bombers without regard to any change in fighter pilots) there were 12 "new" torpedo bomber pilots and 21 new dive bomber pilots, totaling 33 new pilots and 70 fewer planes for a total difference of 103 pilots. If all 48 pilots on the Junyo were non-Pearl Harbor pilots then there could have been 151 new pilots. If all 48 Junyo pilots and the 30 6th Kokutai pilots were Pearl Harbor veterans the total of new pilots could have been as few as 25; quite a large swing. While numbers differ, there were about 70 pilots killed at Coral Sea on the Shokaku and Zuikaku and 110 killed on the four carriers at Midway, without regard to the number of pilots
hospitalized from wounds from the two battles. (The figure of 30 pilots seriously wounded at Midway sticks in my head.)
According to Peattie in Sunburst Japan started the war with an upper limit of 900 experienced carrier pilots. Some were carrier qualified but did not fly from carriers in any of the three battles given staff assignments, some must have been instructors, and a few such as Saburo Sakai were only land based. Depending on what happened to the total of 103 pilots that flew at Pearl Harbor (29 of whom were lost at Pearl Harbor) who did not fly at Coral Sea or Midway then the losses of those pilots together with the number of pilots lost in the two subsequent battles could have put a very serious crimp in a total of 900 experienced pilots.
| |
Aircraft Carried at Pearl Harbor |
Aircraft carried at Midway/Coral Sea |
| Carrier |
Zero |
Kate |
Val |
Zero |
Kate |
Val |
| Akagi |
27 |
27 |
18 |
18 |
18 |
18 |
| Kaga |
27 |
27 |
27 |
18 |
27 |
18 |
| Hiryu |
24 |
18 |
18 |
18 |
18 |
18 |
| Soryu |
27 |
18 |
18 |
18 |
18 |
16 |
| Shokaku |
15 |
27 |
27 |
18 |
19 |
20 |
| Zuikaku |
15 |
27 |
27 |
20 |
22 |
22 |
| Totals |
135 |
144 |
135 |
110 |
122 |
112 |
There were 53 more planes on the 4 Japanese carriers at the Pearl Harbor Raid than at Midway and 17 more planes on the Shokaku and Zuikaku at Pearl Harbor than at Coral Sea for a total of 70.
------------------------------------------------
Jon Parshall replies:
Two points to be made:
1) First, a lot of people look at the aircraft complements for the big Japanese carriers (90 for Akagi, 91 for Kaga, etc) and tend to forget that those were nominal totals that were probably based on operating early 1930s-vintage aircraft (which were smaller). By the time you get to 1941, nobody was carrying that many planes any more. The nominal outfit usually comprised a squadron of each type (either 18 or 27 aircraft for the attack birds) and 3 spares. But in most cases, from what we can tell, they didn't even have the spares.
2) I think the point I would make about Pearl Harbor is that it represented an absolute maximum effort on the part of the Japanese. They were scraping pilots out of training billets, and out of the airgroups of the smaller carriers, in order to fill out the six airgroups for Kido Butai. It wasn't a sustainable level of effort for them, and they had to return those planes and pilots back to their original billets after the operation. So that's one reason you see the air groups on CarDiv 1 and 2 come down in size.
Likewise, from what we can tell from the photographic and diagramatic evidence, you couldn't fit those large air groups on board CarDiv 1 and 2 without resorting to deck parks -- there just wasn't the room in the hangars to do it. Having screwed around with scale drawings of the hangars on all four of those ships, I'm pretty sure you can't get any more than about 72 or so birds into the hangars of CarDiv 1's ships, and about 57 on board CarDiv 2's ships. The Japanese preferred not to use deck parks, as we know, and that's another reason you see CarDiv 1 and 2 bringing their air groups down to a more manageable total by the time of Midway.
Cheers
Jon ------------------------------------------------ Editor's Note:
So maybe to give a first pass at answering your questions:
#1 - I think Jon Parshall answers that very well both in his book and his response. There simply wasn't that much turnover with only a few pilots in each squadron being new to the 4 carriers by the time of Midway. * See chart below.
#2 - It is hard to tell what Nagumo was actually saying. If he was speaking in terms of replacements and carrier opts only then maybe it makes sense.
#3 - As the first question has been discussed on the RoundTable and in other works as one of the reasons but not entirely correct. As for most of the replacement pilots flying Zero's I believe the Zero squadrons did not suffer any more losses than either the Vals or Kates, in fact they probably had fewer losses.
#4 - No evidence suggests that one carrier had any more substantial losses than another.
#5 - I think they were starting to feel the strain but were not at this point scrapping the bottom of the barrel by any means. But I do think the losses both Shokaku and Zuikaku air groups suffered at Coral Sea certainly got their attention. Remember Yamamoto did not consider either carrier would not be available for the Midway operation when he 'lent' them to the Port Morseby invasion. Regardless of what's been written the horrendous losses at Coral Sea to the airgroups of his newest and biggest carriers had to have made an impression.
A breakdown of the pilots of the 4 carriers of Kido Butai at Midway.
| Ship |
Dive Bomber Squadrons |
Torpedo Bomber Squadrons |
| Akagi |
14 Pearl Harbor Vets + 4 New Pilots |
18 Pearl Harbor Vets |
| Kaga |
11 Pearl Harbor Vets + 7 New Pilots |
21 Pearl Harbor Vets + 7 New Pilots |
| Hiryu |
13 Pearl Harbor Vets + 5 New Pilots |
15 Pearl Harbor Vets + 3 New Pilots |
| Soryu |
12 Pearl Harbor Vets + 5 New Pilots |
16 Pearl Harbor Vets + 2 New Pilots |
Note that Soryu also had one D4Y on board to make up the total of 18 dive bombers. The crew members had served on Soryu previously so it is assumed that they were probably Pearl Harbor Vets as well. Also note that Kaga carried 28 pilots but only 27 Kates. It is a possibility that Kaga had temporarily taken one of Soryu's Val's due to the smaller carrier's limited hanger space and the pilot assigned to the Kates might have been the pilot for the transferred Val. Kaga probably had room to store the Val without disassembling it something the Soryu could not do.
Information taken from the Chapter 5 notes of 'Shattered Sword' at the end of the book.
Also of note is the breakdown of Pilot losses for the 4 carriers of Kido Butai at the Battle of Midway.
| Ship |
Pilots lost in battle. |
Pilots lost aboard ship. |
| Akagi |
3 |
4 |
| Kaga |
8 |
13 |
| Hiryu |
64 |
8 |
| Soryu |
6 |
4 |
Information taken from notes in Sunburst: The Rise of Japanese Naval Air Power, 1909-1941 By Mark Peattie and Combined Fleet Decoded by John Prados and provided to the authors by James Sawruk.
Given the above information there were 241 pilots onboard the 4 carriers, 226 plus the 15 pilots of the Zeros being transported for occupation of Midway after it was captured. The Japanese lost 110 pilots leaving 141 first rate pilots. Due to the losses sustained by Shokaku and Zuikaku at Coral Sea many were transferred to the two carriers and subsequently fought at both Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz. So while the losses were not total they were telling in that the surviving pilots could just outfit the two remaining carriers in the Japanese fleet.
Helmuth Hoerner VS-8
From Jim Garnsey:
When the attack on Pearl Harbor occurred on December 7, 1941, I was an eight year old kid living on a short street in Ilion, NY.
English Street consisted of fourteen houses and almost every home had a young man of draft age or about draft age. It was a great place to grow up and every one of these draft age kids was about six years older than me. Each of them went on to serve in the Army, Navy or Army Air Corps, mostly as enlisted men. The first I remember was a young man, who lived across the street from me, named Helmuth Hoerner who had enlisted in the U.S. Navy and became a pilot and commissioned and Ensign. He was home on leave and I still remember after 72 years, that striking young Naval Officer in his dress blues. I made an impression on me then and still does to this day!
Ensign Hoerner participated in the Battle of Midway with VS-8 and for action on June 6, 1942 was awarded the Navy Cross. He went on to serve in the Atlantic where he participated in anti-submarine action, attacking seven submarines, sinking three and credit for a ”probable” for which he won the Distinguished Flying Cross and two Air Medals.
Hoerner spent 22 years in the Navy retiring as a Commander. He died in Punta Gorda, FL, September 16, 2003. In 1949, I enlisted in the U. S. Navy and was delighted to be assigned to Naval Aviation, serving almost four years and discharged as an Aviation Electronics Technician second class in 1952.
------------------------------------------------ Editor's Note:
Here is a link to a past newsletter with more information on Ensign Hoerner.
Back_Issue_2004_14
US AP Bombs at Midway
From Chuck Wohlrab: - appeared in last issue repeated here for reference.
I believe I read, a long time ago, that some of the 1000 lb bombs carried by Dauntlesses at Midway were, in fact Semi-Armor Piercing Bombs. I am not sure of the source anymore. I also read that onboard the Enterprise class carriers there were 40 - 1,600 lb Armor Piercing bombs. These were primarily for use by the TBDs in a level-bombing mode, but a Dauntless coud (just) make it off the deck with one if her fuel load was reduced. I believe it said the combat radius with the 1,600 pounder was something like 50 miles. I believe the source for that was Peter Smith's Midway, Dauntless Victory.
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From Jon Parshall:
This is a topic that pops up every so often, and one that confoozled me at the beginning of my Midway research as well. But the simple answer is that there were no semi-AP bombs used at Midway. They were all GP. Mark Horan made a very careful study of this, and combined it with his interviews of many of the American pilots. All the ordnance dropped at Midway was GP. Semi-AP was only used later in the war.
I should mention, too, that the fuzing was set (IIRC) at 1/100 of a second, which was standard. A GP bomb has all the woof necessary to go through a wooden flight deck and mild steel structure--that's not a problem at all. That fuzing would detonate it a few feet after that, which was perfect. Mark Horan is really the guy to ask on this matter.
------------------------------------------------ Editor's Note:
I have never seen any mention of them in any research I've done either. The confusion is probably a result that the GP bombs were armed with a delayed fuse as I've read many times, including on the RoundTable and perhaps this is where the 'semi-AP' comes in. The 1600 lb AP was introduced in May of 1942 but it is highly doubtful any were on board any of the carriers at Midway as the notes say that only the Avenger or Helldiver had enough power to carry them.
A quick addendum ref. the Norden ("Norton") bomb sight.
From Barrett Tillman:
In researching a couple of books, and lately in reading Tom Wildenburg's upcoming study of Billy Mitchell v. the Naval Establishment, I'm reminded that Norden began his work on a gyro-stabilized sight for the navy. The existing army sights at the time of the 1921 Virginia Capes bombing trials were not up to the task, and apparently some naval sights were obtained.
Comment on Stanhope Ring
From Gregory J. Cook:
I have read and listened to the 2008 book about Torpedo 8, A Dawn Like Thunder, and then recently read the 1946 letter from Stanhope Ring.
I have learned that it is so difficult to write history because one can never be sure the person reporting history was telling the truth. I am convinced that Ring was not telling the truth in his letter. First, he failed to mention the conversation he had with Waldron before Waldron left the formation on his attack that probably saved a victory for the US. “ Stanhope, this is Johnny One” is the kind of call signal Ring admits was made between sq. leaders at the time. He only mentions that Waldron left his flight but wrongly states the direction he travelled. Ring kept the fact that the group flew the 260 degree course a secret in his letter, never mentioning any details. He does not mention the course he flew, he claims Waldron made contact north of the point at which he turned south, so he still clung to the “lie” contained in the Hornet report. Waldron would have had to turn southwest to get to the carriers, not to the northwest as implied by Ring.
I am enraged that a man would continue to carry on the lie four years after good decent men sacrificed themselves for a victory. Ring’s letter found by his daughter only proves his character was lacking. I know the navy did not want to point out the errors by Hornet’s commander Mark M. since Midway was a great victory and [saving grace for him] Ring was probably following Mark M’s orders [he kept his mouth shut, never revealing the blunder]. But to continue the lie four years later is inexcusable in my book.
I love the story of Midway, I cannot stop studying it.
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Editor's Note:
This has been discussed in detail and also outlined in the excellent article by RoundTable editor Ron Russell, 'The Flight to Nowhere' which you can read on our website here:
The Flight to Nowhere
All that being said I think one has to be careful being too upset after the fact about how certain people acted in battle and subsequently afterwards. One must remember that no one was reprimanded after the battle at least officially and I believe all in command positions went on to various other posts throughout the war and served with honor.
Also, and not defending anyone here, but one must remember that the Hornet airgroup was very inexperienced in operating together or at all for that matter. Mistakes were made, no doubt, and maybe some details were not reported in full or at all for whatever reason. And from 'The Flight to Nowhere' RoundTable member :
"VB-8 pilot Clayton Fisher, who clearly remembers seeing Midway’s towering column of black smoke on the horizon to his left as he flew the HAG’s outbound track. That could only have happened on course 240, and Fisher is not the least bit ambiguous about his recollection. He was there and I wasn’t, so I have to believe that he saw what he says he saw."
So things are not always so black and white. If you are outraged at Ring you are certainly entitled to that opinion. I am not. I believe he was doing what he thought was correct at the time and things just didn't work out very well or at all for that matter.
More on the success of the rear seat gunners.
From Brian A Anderson:
Before we can assess the performance of the rear gunners at the Battle of Midway we must understand the purpose of rear gunners.
To understand the purpose of rear gunners we must see the purpose of the bomber they sit in. This purpose is to destroy a designated target by placing ordnance on target. Thus the rear gunners' top purpose is to facilitate the arrival of the bomber at the target and placing of ordnance on target.
Some would evaluate the success of a rear gunner by the number of fighters shotdown. Yet that is very different than the above purpose of the rear gunner.
Based upon the purpose of the bombers, the success of the rear gunners at the Battle of Midway is based upon several matters;
1. number of bombers that made attacks 2. number of bombers shot down
3. number of hits scored
4. crew casualties.
5. number of fighters shot down.
In that order.
The number of carrier launched torpedo bombers was VT3 (13 lost 12), VT6 (14 lost 10) and VT8 (15 lost 15). Land launched Avengers (6 lost 5), Army B26s (4 lost 2).
For a total of 52 torpedo bombers launched and 44 lost. I don't know how many torpedoes were dropped, but they scored no damage. So by the above of success number one was 52 attacked, 44 were shot down, 0 hits, several dead on the surviving aircraft, and 3 fighters shotdown according to Wohlrab's post in the last newsletter. I would say that all said the rear gunners mission failed miserably.
Now before I get jumped on thoroughly, I want to say that this is neither an assessment of bravery, skill nor valor of the brave torpedo bomber crews.
They were sent on a hopeless mission.
Rather it is a condemnation of;
1. the philosophy/doctrine of using gunners on bombers rather than friendly fighters to protect bombers from enemy fighters.
2. underequipping of the gunners. Human aimed single or double 30 or 50 cal machine guns are not sufficient to reliably down or fend of enemy fighers.
3. the crews were overwhelmed with enemy fighters.
4. there were no friendly fighters covering the torpedo bombers from VT6, VT8 and VT3 covered by 4 from VF3. The Avengers and B26s had no fighters either.
It also should be noted that the doctrine of the time called for a combined attack of torpedo and dive bombers supported by fighters. A limited version of this happened with the Yorktown Air Group. But only 4 fighters were present. And the bombers operated on different targets.
Majority of future bomber designs would not include gunners. The discussion of the design of the Skyraider is very pertinent to this doctrinal change.
Nagumo's Turn and Enterprise Dive Bombers
From Ron Russell:
It's great to see that the Roundtable Forum and the BOMRT are still alive and well and attracting serious contributions by our members, both old and new. The December issue included some well-reasoned give and take concerning a few familiar topics of high interest: Nagumo's turn, the impact of the VT attacks, and the reasons that the SBDs met no CAP opposition at their altitude. I appreciate the remarks of those who offered contrary opinions to my comments in the November issue--since it's all in the realm of speculation, none can be branded as absolutely right or wrong.
That said, I'd like to correct one member's assertion that I believe "that the Enterprise dive bombers would likely have missed KB had it not been for the turn." Not quite. Bring up the November newsletter and read my quote again. I'd simply offered the opinion that absent the VT attacks, KB would not have been where McClusky actually found them--they'd be somewhere further along Nagumo's intended track. Since it didn't happen that way, neither I nor anyone else can say for certain that McClusky would or would not have then spotted his target. Tom Cheek (Yorktown F4F pilot) told us that the area was saturated with towering cumulus clouds--recall that Howard Ady had only spotted 2 of the 4 carriers, and that only happened thanks to a break in the clouds. So any opinion that McClusky would certainly have found KB regardless of the turn, the VT attacks, or anything else is ignoring possible circumstances that could argue otherwise.
And in any case, once again, even if McClusky had found KB at its new location, he would not have done it at the same moment that VB-3 did, and it's that fantastic coincidence, in large measure, that gave us the Incredible Victory.
Charge of the Devastators Update
From Paul Corio
I have just launched the Kickstarter crowd funding campaign for "The Charge of the Devastators" book/movie project. This time I am seeking funding for the book aspect, looking for support to develop my completed screenplay into an action packed novel. The Kickstarter platform is far superior in every way to the former platform I used. Check out the page and view the videos and other information. Here's the link:
Charge of the Devastators KickStarter
This worthy campaign -- which is all about telling the TRUE story of the heroism and sacrifice of the great Battle of Midway veterans -- and telling those stories in the dramatic, awe inspiring, epic fashion that they deserve.
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