Extracts from the sources:
http://www.midway42.org/Midway_AAR/RAdm_Fletcher.aspx
Battle of Midway: 4-7 June 1942, Online Action Reports: Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, Serial 01849 of 28 June 1942
At 0545 the most important contact of the battle was made. A PBY reported many planes heading for Midway 150 miles distant on bearing 320; 7 minutes later another PBY sighted 2 of the enemy carriers and many other ships on the same bearing, distant 180 miles, coming in at 25 knots on course 135.
Naval Air Station Midway War Diary
pages 29 - 31
[There are no sightings of the Japanese prior to 0545]
0545 - 3V58 [Chase] reported in PLAIN ENGLISH “Many planes heading Midway IMI Midway, bearing 320, distance 150”
0552 – 4V48 [Ady] reported 2 carriers and main body ships, carriers in front, course 135, speed 25.
0637 – 4V58 reports “Am returning to Pearl Harbor unless otherwise directed.”
0915 – 4V58 attacked by single engine seaplane.
0945 – 4V58 reports bearing 357, distance 210
1220 – 4V58 reports running into fog.
[There is no mention of 3V58 after 0545. There is no mention if 4V58 received additional instructions after its 0637 report.]
Symonds, “The Battle of Midway”
Chapter 11, p. 225
At 5:34 …a report from Lieutenant Howard P. Ady … The first words of his report … “Enemy Carrier bearing 320 (degrees), distance 180 (miles).
…Before any of them could man their planes, however, another PBY pilot, Lieutenant William A. Chase called in to report: “Many planes headed Midway.
Chapter 11, p. 228
Ady’s 5:34 sighting report did not reach the American carriers until 6:03, when it was relayed from Pearl Harbor.
But before Fletcher gave Spruance the go order, two factors stayed his hand. The first was that Ady’s report indicated the presence of only two carriers.
[There is no mention of a second report from Ady after 5:34. Fletcher couldn’t know there were two carriers from the 0534 report. Did Symonds simply omit the 0552 report?]
Parshall, “Shattered Sword”
Chapter 7, p. 134
… Lt Howard P Ady’s PBY had detected Nagumo’s carriers at around 0530 and broadcast as much at 0534. [cites Prange] Shortly thereafter, another PBY, flown by Lt William A Chase, sighted Japanese aircraft inbound and radioed in plain at 0544 “Many planes heading Midway.” Chase subsequently sighted the Japanese fleet as well, transmitting at 0552 “Two carriers and battleships bearing 320 distance 180 course 135 speed 25.” Crucially, Chase only reported seeing two Japanese flattops.[cites Prange]
[Parshall states Ady detected the carriers at 0534 but doesn’t mention how many carriers he reported. Yet in the last sentence he states Chase saw two carriers.]
Prange, “Miracle at Midway”
Chapter 21 p.190
… a report at 0520 from Catalina Number 4V58 of sighting an unidentified plane. … the pilot of that particular aircraft, Lieutenant Howard P. Ady, and his co-pilot Lieutenant (j.g.) Maurice “Snuffy” Smith. … had probably spotted one of the Japanese search planes.
Ten minutes later[0530], Midway received another radio from Ady, this time reporting a “carrier bearing 320, distance 180”
At 0545 … Lieutenant (j.g.) William A. Chase (Flight 3V58) was scouting in a sector adjacent to Ady’s when his observer, Ensign W. C. Corbell, sighted two groups of forty-five planes … Chase dispatched the word in plain Engllish: “Many planes heading Midway bearing 320 degrees, distance 150.
[In the last paragraph of the page Prange talks about how Ady saw Kido Butai through a break in the clouds. Yet his next sentence states:]
… At 0552 Chase reported his sighting. "Two carriers and main body ships, carriers in front, course 135, speed 35"
Chronology Appendix p. 440
0520 Ady reports unidentified aircraft
0530 Ady reports an enemy carrier.
0545 Chase reports “Many planes heading Midway...”
0552 Ady reports “Two carriers and main body ships…”
0534 Enterprise receives report of a carrier 0553 Enterprise receives “many planes” report 0600 Enterprise receives word of “two enemy carriers…”
[Prange’s text and timeline don’t agree on who sent the 0552 spotting report.]
My Questions:
1. Who made the 0552 report of “two carriers?” Was it Chase or Ady? (see question 2)
Sighting reports from all 4 sources above:
0520: Ady reports sighting unidentified plane. [Prange is the only one who mentions this report.]
0530-0534: Ady reports” one enemy carrier…” [Prange & Symonds agrees on this. Pashall only states Ady detected the carriers with no mention of how many were reported. His source was Prange. The message was relayed by Pearl Harbor and reached Fletcher around 0600-0603]
0543-0545: Chase reports “Many planes headed Midway.” [Everyone agrees on this]
0552: “Two carriers…” spotting report [The AAR doesn’t say who sent it, Prange contradicts himself, Parshall says Chase, Symonds doesn’t mention this report but implies Ady.]
2. Could both Chase and Ady have reported their sighting within a few moments of each other? None of the sources agree on the text of the report.
• The AAR says: “sighted 2 of the enemy carriers and many other ships on the same bearing, distant 180 miles, coming in at 25 knots on course 135”
• Parshall says: “Two carriers and battleships bearing 320 distance 180 course 135 speed 25.”
• Prange says: “Two carriers and main body ships, carriers in front, course 135, speed 35”
3. What happened to Ady and Chase after the sighting reports? They completely disappear from the AAR and all three books after the initial sighting reports. There are no additional reports on Kido Butai from either plane after 0552. Shouldn’t they have stayed in contact with Kido Butai and sent amplifying reports?
Based on the NAS Midway War Diary Aldy remained in the vicinity of Kido Butai from 0552 to at least 0637, a period of 45 min. There are no additional messages from Ady until 0637 when he says he is returning to Pearl Harbor. What was he doing? Two hours and 38 min. later, at 0915, Ady is attacked by a single engine seaplane. Perhaps this was one of Kido Butai’s scout planes.
Chase’s 3V58 isn’t mentioned in the diary
There is no mention of further reports from them after 0552.
4. Why was Fletcher getting spotting reports relayed through Pearl Harbor? Wasn’t Yorktown monitoring the frequency used by the PBYs? Was Pearl Harbor simply relaying the reports as a backup measure? I understand radio technology was vastly different in the 40s.
• Symonds says Ady’s 0534 report was received at 0603. That is a 29 min. delay. This seems unreasonable and must be an error.
• Prange’s chronology shows Ady’s 0530 report received at 0534, a 4 min. delay, and the 0552 report received at 0600, an 8 min. delay. The doubling of the delay time from 4 to 8 min. isn’t addressed.
Editors Note: Mr. Tynam you certainly have done your research. First I have added you to the RoundTable email list. Second let me answer the questions as best I can. Certainly there are members on the RoundTable with more complete or more accurate information. Hope they can chime in.
1. Who made the 0552 report of “two carriers?” Was it Chase or Ady? (see question 2)
Ady. Chase was in the adjacent sector and so would not have altered course to be able to see the Japanese fleet. Nor would that be doctrine. He had an assigned sector and had to stay on course. Ady's reports were as follows:
0534 “Enemy Carriers”
0540 “ED 180 sight 320”
0552 “Two carriers and main body of ships, carriers in front, course 135, speed 25”
Ady actually overflew the Japanese fleet after the 5:34 report, circled back around and through a break in the clouds (remember the Japanese fleet was under cloud cover at this time) sighted two of the Japanese Carriers.
2. Could both Chase and Ady have reported their sighting within a few moments of each other?
Yes. Ady reports sighting Japanese ships at 5:34 and Chase reports Many planes at 5:45. Chase never did see the Japanese fleet as he was too far away on a different course. This is the only report he sent concerning the Japanese fleet, or more accurately their attack planes heading towards Midway.
3. What happened to Ady and Chase after the sighting reports? They completely disappear from the AAR and all three books after the initial sighting reports.
Both Ady and Chase and all the other PBY's were ordered to return to Pearl Harbor after completing their assigned sectors. It was felt at the time that the Japanese attack on Midway would make it too dangerous to try to return to Midway. So they turned Southeast and headed to Pearl, or more accurately The French Frigate Shoals. They first had to stop and get refueled along the way at one of the shoals that made up the island chain between Pearl and Midway. The French Frigate Shoals were a perfect spot where the US had sent a tender for just such a purpose. Ironically this prevented the Japanese from using it as a base to refuel the flying boat from a submarine to recon Pearl before the battle to insure the US carriers were still in port. A happy coincidence as it turned out. Here is a story from a member on his experiances during the battle. Worth the read to gain some perspective on what actually happened to the PBY's. http://www.midway42.org/Features/GeraldFChildVP23.aspx
There are no additional reports on Kido Butai from either plane after 0552. Shouldn’t they have stayed in contact with Kido Butai and sent amplifying reports?
No. This was not their job. They needed to complete their search sectors so after Ady reported the Japanese fleet, circled back around to get a better look, he continued to search his assigned sector. This was early in the war and specific doctrine of staying with a contact did not become standard till later in the war. There was a signal that was to be transmitted to the pilots if contact was made but as you see in the article above, not all got the message.
4. Why was Fletcher getting spotting reports relayed through Pearl Harbor? Wasn’t Yorktown monitoring the frequency used by the PBYs? Was Pearl Harbor simply relaying the reports as a backup measure? I understand radio technology was vastly different in the 40s.
To put it in one of the Admirals at the time, the reports were 'maddening'. The carriers were both monitoring the PBY's channels but didn't have a reference on where their search sectors necessarily were, but they could figure them out. Pearl Harbor was relaying the messages but they were picked up earlier by the carriers themselves. But if you look at the messages Ady sent out the first one does not give any info other than a sighting report. The second gives distance and bearing while the 3rd gives course and speed. The second two were only useful if used together. The first barely useful other than a report that the carriers were where they were expected to be, somewhere northwest of Midway.
As a side note Howard Ady was one of the founding members of The Midway RoundTable. I suppose he was officially member number one. Fred Price who met him by chance and struck up a conversation at I believe an airport started to exchange emails with Howard Ady. Soon several other veterans who were probably known by Ady and contacted started to join in the conversations. Soon dozens of veterans were all chatting about their expericances. Thus The Midway RoundTable was formed. This was early to mid 1990's and sadly many of the emails have since been lost to time. I have a CD of early email exchanges but only date them back to about 1997 or so when Fred Price decided the RoundTable emails should be preserved. They are spotty and hard to follow but I'm putting them together.
In 2004 Ron Russell who took over the duties around 2000 or so started to publish them on a web site he created. I have kept the archive from 2004 when he started this and am going to add the earlier emails to the web pages as I get time. A project to say the least. At any rate Ady pretty much confirmed what happened as I've laid it out. Hope this helps. Be glad to clarify any other questions you might have. And we may see some comments from our members on the discussions pages in the coming month.