The Battle of Midway Roundtable Opening Remarks
Welcome to the December 2023 issue of the Battle of Midway RoundTable. This month we have a much longer issue than our last one. Thanks to everyone who contributed.
The titles in this issue speaks for itself. So I won't go into any brief descriptions other than we have some well read and intellegent members who continue to discuss events that happened 82 years ago. Why this is important. My personal believe it is for future generations. Hopefully the information contained in the newsletters and articles on The Battle of Midway RoundTable will be of interest to future historians as will Ron Russell's excellent book. It is extemely rare to have so many participants of any particular battle discuss their actions let alone have a forum where they exchanged stories and discussed events of the battle. This is something very special and one all of us should not take for granted. The veterans of the battle have given us an inside look into an event that was quite possibly one of the greatest naval battles in history. Each and every one of them that are or were members at one time or another over the past 26 years, thank you.
There are already some good articles for the January 2024 issue so best to start putting that together. In the mean time sit back and enjoy.
"The Man Who Won WW II" (cont.)
5 December 2023 From Clark Whelton
Thank you for publishing my letter on “The Man Who Won World War II,” an article on the Battle of Midway that I wrote for Argosy magazine in March, 1974.
There is one thing I forgot to mention. The artwork for the article was outstanding. Featured was a stirring illustration of an SBD diving at a steep angle toward a Japanese carrier below. I wish I had a copy of that excellent painting.
I wrote a letter of thanks to the artist, whose name I can’t recall. In my letter I mentioned some details that had caught my eye. The SBD in the painting had red stripes on the tail, and red circles inside the white stars on the wings and fuselage. These insignia were seen on Navy warplanes when WW II began.
In my letter I mentioned to the artist that the red stripes and circles are not seen in official photographs from Midway. He was ready for my question, and wrote back saying that the order to paint over the stripes and circles was not effective until 1 June 1942. “By that time,” he said, “ Hornet, Enterprise and Yorktown had already sailed from Pearl. So, the stripes and circles must have still been on the planes at Midway.”
I didn’t know how to reply. Only later did it occur to me that all three carriers had well-equipped paint lockers. If the stripes and circles had not been painted over at Pearl, there would have been sufficient time to comply with the order on the way to Midway.
With best regards,
Clark Whelton New York, NY
It's interesting even at this late date where the red ball inside the star comes up on artist paintings or posts. Saw one on Facebook today. The one thing that is interesting about the US Carriers is that they couldn't paint the red balls out on the bottom of the TBD wings as the wings were too long to unfold in the hanger. So the red ball stayed until they could get the TBD's to the flight deck where they were painted out. Not exactly sure when the last of them were painted out be definately by the time of the battle as any pictures or file clearly shows there were no red balls left on any insignia.
-TW
Importance of the battle of Midway
4 December 2023 From Job van Aalst
My name is Job and I am a scholar from the Netherlands. I am writing a thesis on the battle of Midway with the main question: to what extent was the Battle of Midway the turning point of the Second World War in Asia. I was wondering if you might give me some consequenses from the Battle of Midway or other information from the battle that I could focus on.
Sincerely,
Job van Aalst
Thank you for contacting. I will try to answer briefly. If you need more context let me know and I can elaborate.
Historians debate two schools of thought on what event was the turning point in the Pacific war. One says that Midway was the turning point, the other says it was the Guadalcanal campaign. Both have valid arguments.
Guadalcanal was a close run thing over the course of several months with the US eventually forcing the Japanese to abandon the island. The Japanese lost most of their pre-war trained pilots and several ships they could not afford to lose. After the campaign the Japanese went on the defensive for good.
The other train of thought is that Midway was the decisive turning point. Up until Midway the Japanese carrier fleet had been a force the US, as well as the Commonwealth, was not prepared for. The raid on Pearl Harbor had brought to light exactly how devastating a carrier fleet was. Despite missing the US carriers at Pearl Harbor the Japanese carrier fleet continued to dominate the Pacific from Australia to Ceylon. The Japanese were clearly on the offensive up until Midway. After the loss of the 4 first line carriers as well as their entire complement of aircraft, many of the trained flight deck crews, a factor most overlook, and many but not all pilots and air crew, the Japanese never went on the offensive again. There were multiple reasons for this but the 4 carriers were not replaceable and carriers were now the decisive weapon of the Pacific war. The loss of over 300 aircraft was again very hard to replace. Japanese industry just wasn't capable of making good on so many aircraft
in a short amount of time. Then there was the loss of many pre-war pilots. By the time the Battle of Midway was fought the Japanese carriers had already lost a number of pre-war pilots in operations over the first 6 months of the war. The four carriers received replacement pilots prior to sailing for Midway and the raid on Midway was made by as significant number of these pilots. The loss of many more pilots and aircrew at The Battle of Midway was a severe problem.
All that said if Midway had not gone the way it did, then the US would not have been able to launch an attack on Guadalcanal at all. Japan would still have been on the offensive. Yamamoto was planning further attacks on US held Islands if Midway failed to draw out the US carriers. Midway ended that for good. After Midway the balance of power shifted to the US as they now had 3 first line carriers, Enterprise, Hornet, and Saratoga, to the Japanese 2, Shokaku and Zuikaku. When the Wasp was transferred to the pacific in July one could argue the balance of power was 4 to 2.
Consequences of the battle. US went on the offensive 2 months later. Japan went stagnant immediately after the battle and then on the defensive when Guadalcanal was invaded.
Hope this helps. Again if you have any further questions or additional details let me know and I'll see if I can supply you with what you need.
-TW
7 December 2023
From Job van Aalst
Thank you so much for your response! I apreciate it very much. I have a lot I can work on now. I was wondering how the U.S. used the initiative it had gained at Midway. This is of course visible in the Guadalcanal campaign but are there other examples? Again, thank you for your response.
Best regards,
Job
Thank you. Glad it was of some help. As for exploiting any initiative the US had after the battle they really didn't have much chance. The US was aware of the Japanese on Tulagi Island in May before the Battle of Coral Sea. Shortly after Midway in early July they discovered the Japanese were building an airbase on Guadalcanal. King ordered the invasion of Guadalcanal to block the Japanese from completing the air base. So really any initiative the US had was diverted to Guadalcanal.
Because of that intervention we are unclear what the US would have done next. There was not much time between the Battle and the discovery of the air base and the orders to invade. Any potential planning the US had was probably nothing more than talks at that point. I have never seen anything in writing to indicate what they would have done.
For the most part the tactical plan of the US was completed at Midway. They neutralized the Japanese navy and evened the balance of power in the Pacific having three first line carriers, Enterprise, Hornet, and Saratoga to the Japanese Shokaku and Zuikaku. But three against two were no guarantee of success as displayed at Midway. Plus the distance to potential targets in the pacific were clearly out of reach given that the logistic capabilities in 1942. They were not up to a long distance attack on a Japanese base. At this point in the war Japanese land based air power was still quite potent so risking the three US carriers against land based air was something Nimitz was not keen to do. New construction of US carriers were still a year off or more so no help was coming if they lost any more carriers.
The US transferred Wasp to the Pacific after Midway to shore up strength for the invasion of Guadalcanal. Hornet needed to train new pilots. But Wasp should have never been assigned to a role she was not prepared for and paid the price for lack of sufficient protection. But the US had little option as they needed the additional air power for the coming invasion.
Guadalcanal showed how any attack the US would have made on their own against any other Japanese base would have likely turned out. The US lost both Wasp and Hornet with Saratoga damaged and out of the war for months. At one point Enterprise, despite damage received at the Battle of Santa Cruz, was the only first line carrier left in the Pacific. At this point the Japanese still had Shokaku, although damaged during the battle, and Zuikaku so the balance of power again shifted slightly back to the Japanese with the two converted carriers Junyo and Hiyo, repaired after the engine problems before Santa Cruze, plus Zuikaku. Fortunately for the US the once powerful Japanese carrier force had spent itself. Shokaku and Zuikaku returned to Japan for repairs and to resupply their air groups and did not return till 1943 leaving only Junyo and Hiyo to support any future battles in the Solomons.
So to your question on how the US used the initiative they gained after Midway. It was diverted to invading Guadalcanal and that was about it. There was simply no time to exploit any opportunities gained after the battle. And to what extent the US could have exploited the advantage we will never know.
Again any further info let me know. Glad to help.
-TW
11 December 2023 From Job van Aalst
I am very gratfull for your extensive response. I have a lot I can work on now, thank you very much! I will let you know how if I have further questions.
Best regards,
Job
Two Silver Waterfalls
5 December 2023 From Barrett Tillman
Ref duplicate "Silver Waterfalls" and book titles generally. Correct I learned in college that titles (and character names) are not copyrightable. First example that occurred to me is The Mighty 8th with 5 or 6 books.
Same with movie titles, excluding remakes. Broken Arrow 1950 was a Western. The 1996 iteration was a Nuclear Weapon Drama.
I trod the Title Line with my 1979 NIP F6F history Hellcat and 1996 Hellcats, sequel to Dauntless.
Barrett
5 December 2023 From Ron Russell
The "Silver Waterfall" issue is old news on the Roundtable. The Kevin Miller novel was reviewed in our May 2020 newsletter, and the Simms-McGregor duplicate is in the May '22 issue. See the links:
http://www.midway42.org/Backissues/2020/20200501.aspx
http://www.midway42.org/Backissues/2022/20220501.aspx
Short version: Miller's novel is darned good, a close second to Barrett's Dauntless for the BOM in real-time. But #2 is a disappointment on multiple levels. I did the usual pre-edit for those guys, including a strong recommendation that they re-think their title--Miller's BOM book was only 2 years old. They took most of my advice but not that one, leaving me to forbid them to use my name in any of their acknowledgements or promotions for the book--I felt the title duplication was an incredibly poor decision; an obvious and unnecessary confusion factor in the marketplace, doing no good at all for either book.
The second book has other flaws, as enumerated in the May '22 Roundtable review. Barrett, you endorsed it? Ewwwww.....
On the other hand, Barrett, I see we're on the same page with regard to the MOH for Midway's VT pilots. Great minds can think alike!
BTW re the duplicated Silver Waterfall title, yes, we've seen it before. There are two "Miracle at Midways" out there, and Prang's was #2 in that set. Can't copyright titles. Too bad.
--Ron
8 December 2023
From Barrett Tillman
OK I admit it: my bad. My endorsement was based on a hasty flip-thru (mainly tekkie stuff) rather than a complete read. What I get for agreeing to multiple tentative blurbs.
Just caught a glitch in an otherwise laudable book upcoming next year: nine CVL-22 boats commissioned per month. sheesh. But the author (USAF type) correctly computed Essexes at the rate of one every 60 days (my XX century match yields 1 in 57 days.)
I still hold that Mitscher's MoH fascination led him to the Van Voorhees PB4Y flail. The investigation was badly flawed, relying on memories of locals when IJN sources clearly disproved the citation. Guess Dave McCampbell wasn't enough...
As ever
Barrett
8 December 2023
From Ron Russell
No problem, Barrett, John Lundstrom once told me that he flubbed the CV5 BOM launch sequence in The First Team, Parshall-Tully left I-168 out of Shattered Sword, and of course I originally had Clay Fisher proven to be on 240 vice 265, so we all make mistakes, including those of us in really good company.
The Simms-McGregor Silver Waterfall was interesting in its depth of research on the backstory guys like Heineman, but so inept with regard to the Pacific War itself. For instance (besides the sunken CV6 already mentioned), they had Navy fighters shooting down Yamamoto in '43. Pretty hard. You recall my editing methodology, red and blue. Lotsa red. Even so, I would've been happy to let them add my name and the BOMRT among their acknowledgements if they'd changed their title, and I gave them chapter-and-verse as to why they needed to do it. They didn't--forehead slap!
Best wishes always,
--Ron
8 December 2023 From Barrett Tillman
I reckon that the Ignore Competent Comment Syndrome is endemic. At least. Cannot help thinking of the recent BOM movie. Sheesh-o-dear. As I wrote for Naval History, "It is not terrible." (Damn With Faint Praise Syndrome.)
Quick divert: I've queried Rich, John L, Jon P and a couple others as to how they acquired The Pacific Theater Virus. Nearly all from childhood exposure, with no inoculation possible. Might be a subject for the roundtable—maybe starting with you?
As ever
BT
8 December 2023 From Ron Russell
Good idea re the survey on what brought us to the PacWar. My story starts with BMC Allen BeMent, USN-Ret, who exited CV5 at the BOM. By chance, he got into radio-electronics as a hobby in retirement, and that's how I encountered him in the local ham radio club, when I was about 16. He had lots of stories about the Navy, with an occasional mention of the Yorktown. That more than anything influenced my decision to join the USNR at 18 rather than get drafted by the Army (plus the fact that knowing radio up front got me E-3 upon enlisting). So Chief BeMent not only gets credit for eventually landing me in the BOMRT and among all of you, but his radio mentoring determined the rest of my life in numerous important ways, such as my ultimate main career in telecom plus even meeting my wife it college--my choice of electronic engineering classes caused a set of circumstances that resulted in the introduction. Come to think of it, our son can thank him for the same reason! High-5 once again to
Chief BeMent, RIP.
--Ron
As I have stated before my own journey to study the Pacific War was influenced by my father who served in the Pacific and would sometimes be visited by his Navy buddy and they told stories while I sat on the floor and listened. He also brought back lots of pictures. I don't think this was allowed but somehow he managed to shoot 48 rolls of film, each one mailed home and only developed once he returned from the war. My interest was a chance viewing of a TV program on the Battle of Midway while visiting my grandmother. A week or so later while shopping with my mother I saw a copy of Avalon Hill's Midway game in a drug store. Yes drug stores in those days carried a little bit of everything. Reading Wade McClusky's account of the battle and playing the game had me looking for more and leading me to read as much on the battle as I could find.
Anyone out there that has a story send it to me and I'll put it in future newsletters.
-TW
13 December 2023 From Kevin Miller
My name is Kevin Miller, a member of BoMRT, and the author of The Silver Waterfall: A Novel of the Battle of Midway, brought to the attention of members by Barrett Tillman in the October 2023 issue. My novel was published on 4 June 2020.
Yes, there are two Midway works with this title. My work is a novel. The other TSW, written by Brendan Simms and Steve McGregor of the UK, is a non-fiction analysis the battle and was published almost two years later on May 22, 2022.
The Silver Waterfall: A Novel of the Battle of Midway, was reviewed on these pages by Ron Russell in the May 2020, who kindly assisted me with research. Member Ed "Boris" Beakley - who received an advanced reader copy - commented favorably. The novel spent its first 12 months as an Amazon genre best seller and has earned four writing awards to date, with over 1,500 ratings and 200 reviews on Amazon and Goodreads. It is available in digital form, soft and hard cover, and audiobook.
Ron Russell informed me that Simms and McGregor reached out to him for a review of their work. Ron declined as their work had the same title as mine. I decided not to contact the authors to wave them off from a title already taken. As the last issue correctly states, book titles cannot be copyrighted. So, if I wish, I could title my next work For Whom the Bell Tolls and the author's estate would have little recourse. (Interestingly, an author new to military fiction plans to publish under the same title I used on one of my contemporary carrier novels over seven years ago. I'm not fighting it and together we will cross-promote.)
As far as the title selection, as an independent author (with a publisher, Braveship Books) that's all me. Who could resist Thach's eyewitness description of VB-3 falling on Soryu?
There are several fictional works about this battle, notably Barrett Tillman's superb novel - all the more impressive because it was written before the watershed Shattered Sword - and Jeff Shaara's disappointing effort that calls into question the accuracy of this other historical fiction works. Others in and out of uniform have written historical fiction novels about Midway. The Silver Waterfall: A Novel of the Battle of Midway jumps right into the battle and changes no facts. It is the human story of the real men who fought at Midway on both sides, written with the insights of a career carrier pilot and lifelong student of the battle.
Hat tip to you, Barrett. Like you, it also took me 20 years (and a number of months) to write The Silver Waterfall: A Novel of the Battle of Midway.
Very Respectfully,
Kevin Miller
CAPT USN (ret.)
Medal of Honors for Midway Aviators
6 December 2023 From Tom Rychlik
I very much appreciate your kind words on my effort to appropriately recognize the three Torpedo Bomber Squadron Commanding Officers at the BOM in the most recent issue of the Roundtable. More on that in a bit but first allow me to comment on some of the other commentors.
Regarding Clark Whelton’s discussion on RAdm McClusky. I agree that without RAdm McClusky’s adroit decision making that allowed him to find Kido Butai, we don’t win the Battle of Midway. However, there were other aspects of the story that need to be mentioned. Admiral Spruance inherited Admiral Halsey’s staff and with it his Operations Officer Captain Browning. As a black shoe, Spruance was initially dependent on Browning’s aviation experience although by June 5th Spruance had seen enough and he sided with McClusky over Browning for the afternoon strike that ended up finding Tanikaze. As a former fighter pilot McClusky, was not proficient in dive bombing techniques or apparently dive bomber tactics. Depending upon who tells it, there has been a long-standing controversy over who was supposed to do what when McClusky and the Enterprise’s dive bombers arrived over Kido Butai. It’s a complicated story that includes Bombing Six’s position relative to Scouting Six, the doctrinal aspects of
the lead squadron taking the furthest target, the relative positions between Kaga and Akagi, and the last minute radio communications issued by both McClusky and LtCdr Best. The bottom line is that when McClusky dove on Kaga he took Scouting Six and all but Best’s section of Bombing Six with him. If Best hadn’t immediately diverted and hit Akagi with his one 1000-pound bomb, things would have turned out much differently.
McClusky was emboldened to confront Browning on June 5th because he had the backing of both dive bomber squadrons. Would it be that McClusky had felt confident enough to have questioned Browning’s sequence of launch on June 4th? Unlike Yorktown, who launched the slower, shorter ranged, Torpedo Three first, then the faster longer legged Bombing Three second, and then the much faster cruising but shorter ranged Fighting Three escort, and then performed a running rendezvous, Enterprise launched its dive bombers first. Browning’s approach had the SBDs burning significant amounts of fuel, that they would all need later in the mission, while Enterprise respotted its flight deck to launch Torpedo Six. The end result of this was that Admiral Spruance grew concerned after being made aware the Japanese had spotted our carriers and directed McClusky to proceed without Torpedo Six and Fighting Six, thereby ensuring a piecemeal attack and dooming Torpedo Six. McClusky was also part of another
important incident that I will mention in a bit.
Clark also discusses his interactions with RAdm Max Leslie on how Leslie found Kido Butai. I don’t know how old Leslie was at the time of these discussions but there are a number of sources to include A Glorious Page In Our History that detail how Torpedo Three first sighted the smoke from Torpedo Squadron Six’ attack and that Leslie noticed the change in course of Torpedo Three and altered his course appropriately while radioing Massey to ask if he had spotted the enemy. Speaking of Leslie one of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) documents that I received is a 1981 letter from RAdm Leslie that provides his complete support and rational for upgrading the posthumous Navy Crosses for LCDRs Waldron, Lindsey, and Massey to MOH.
WRT to Barrett Tillman’s comments. In the documents I have sent Congress and that they have forwarded to the Secretary of Navy, I have used Barrett’s amazing books extensively. As I state in the attached analysis of World War II, Korean War, and Vietnam MOHs the Navy has a terrible record compared to the Marine Corps and Army. The statistics speak for themselves. In 2022 I spoke to Cory Ackerman at the Medal of Honor Museum on the subject of whether disobedience of an order was an excluding criteria for the award of the MOH. Cory has access to the award correspondence associated with every MOH recipient. He stated that in the records of quite a few modern day MOH recipients there was frequently some discussion concerning how the recipient had disobeyed some aspect of orders, be it direct, general, or otherwise in accomplishing his mission. Most recently Captain Larry Taylor USA was awarded the MOH for his actions on June 18, 1968, in Vietnam. President Biden made detailed remarks
about how Captain Taylor was ordered to abort the planned rescue mission but disobeyed those orders! Barrett probably hits the nail on the head that in FAdm Earnie King’s Navy, what Waldron did would have made a MOH for Waldron a bureaucratic impossibility. But did King know? What has surprised me the most in my research is that FAdm Nimitz chose not to look into the horrible performance of the Hornet Air Group on the morning of June 4th and the clearly inaccurate After-Action report submitted by VAdm Mitscher. Was it because he had plans for Mitscher to one day lead the Fast Carrier Task Forces and an investigation might have led to facts that would have precluded that plan?
Which leads me to your November 2 comments. To be clear, although I personally believe that every one of the 47 (41 TBDs, 6 TBFs) pilots that attacked Kido Butai on the morning of June 4, 1942, deserve the MOH, I have decided to limit my efforts to the three Commanding Officers. But let me quote what was said in the Navy Cross Citations for Torpedo Six: “The unprecedented conditions under which his squadron launched its offensive were so exceptional that it is highly improbable the occasion may ever recur where other pilots of the service will be called upon to demonstrate an equal degree of gallantry and fortitude.”
The fact that VAdm Ring received a Navy Cross, the same award as Waldron, Lindsey, and Massey appalls me. That General Douglas MacArthur received a MOH for the 1941-2 unsuccessful defense of the Philippines in which he engaged in no direct act of valor against the enemy shows how political the MOH was in 1942. That a Rear Admiral and two Battleship Commanding Officers were awarded the Medal of Honor at Pearl Harbor for essentially manning their battle stations and being killed, like many of their crews, tells you the Navy had a far different standard for the MOH immediately after Pearl Harbor as opposed to six months later at Midway when not one Navy sailor was awarded the MOH despite countless demonstrations of incredible valor!
161 of 162 of the Navy pilots and officer aircrew, Marine Corps pilots, and the Army B26 aircrew (enlisted included) who attacked the Japanese aircraft carriers on the morning of June 4, 1942, received either the Navy Cross or its Army equivalent. The 162nd, Captain Richard Fleming USMC, posthumously received the MOH for his actions on June 4th and 5th. Unlike the Army aircrews, the enlisted Navy and Marine Corps aircrews received Distinguished Flying Crosses. Additionally, another 21 pilots received the Navy Cross for participating in subsequent attacks against Japanese ships over the next two days. It would appear that due to the fog of war and the lack of detailed information on what actually happened in the cases of the three Commanding Officers, the Pacific Fleet Board of Awards gave everyone Navy Crosses and moved on.
I am convinced that if an investigation had been conducted, it would likely have demonstrated Waldron’s remarkable devotion to duty. As you so astutely summarized in your book and on the Roundtable, had Waldron not departed the erroneous course of the Hornet Air Group, his squadron would never have contacted the enemy. Waldron’s attack began a series of events that directly led to the destruction of the Japanese aircraft carrier Soryu, and similarly unopposed and devastating attacks on carriers Kaga and Akagi. The Battle of Midway doesn’t end with an American victory without these events. Without the vast amount of smoke generated by Torpedo Eight’s attack, Torpedo Squadron Six would not have located and then attacked the Japanese aircraft carriers. Torpedo Squadron Eight’s and Torpedo Squadron Six’s attacks tied up the Japanese aircraft carrier flight decks servicing their Combat Air Patrol (CAP) fighters which kept the Japanese from spotting and then launching a counter strike at
our carriers. As events would play out, this result, in and of itself, may have sealed our victory. The smoke from Torpedo Squadron Six’s attack alerted Massey to a necessary course change, which then alerted the remainder of the Yorktown Air Group to alter their course, otherwise they too would have missed the Japanese fleet. The attacks by all three torpedo bomber squadrons focused the Japanese CAP on the low altitude torpedo threat, allowing Bombing Squadron Six, Scouting Squadron Six, and Bombing Squadron Three to attack without any fighter opposition and sink three of four Japanese carriers. Had these events not occurred in the exact order they did, it is unlikely the US would have won the battle, a battle that arguably is the most important naval victory in American history. Waldron’s awards file does not mention any of this nor does his posthumous Navy Cross Citation. The document that nominated Waldron and all of Torpedo Eight for the MOH, Captain Mitscher’s after-action
report, was not included in Waldron’s awards file. His Navy Cross citation does not mention his squadron was opposed by 18-26 Zero fighters or that all his men followed his last instructions to their end: “If there is only one plane left to make the final run-in, I want that man to go in and get a hit.” McClusky’s unopposed and successful attack greatly benefited by Waldron’s actions and the slaughter of the Torpedo squadrons. So, if McClusky won the battle, can we say Waldron kept us from losing it?
Getting back to my earlier mention of things that affect my opinion of McClusky’s actions on June 4th and your thoughts on what call of duty meant. In the case of Lieutenant Commander Lindsey, my research shows he left the sickbay of the USS Enterprise and, at his insistence, had to be helped into the cockpit of his aircraft on the morning of June 4th by his crew chief due to injuries (badly sprained back, broken ribs - one of which punctured his lung, and multiple bruises and lacerations about his face and chest). He sustained these injuries on May 28th when his torpedo bomber crashed on landing. At breakfast on June 4th, in the presence of McClusky, one of Lindsey’s pilots asked: “You look pretty beat-up Skipper. You really feel well enough to fly today?” Lindsey replied: “This is the real thing today, Pablo, the thing we’ve been training for. I’ll take the squadron in.” No mention of Lindsey’s injuries and his effort to lead his squadron into battle was made on his posthumous Navy
Cross Citation, nor is it a part of his official record. With the exception of stating he was the Squadron Commander, his Navy Cross citation reads exactly the same as the other 13 Torpedo Squadron Six pilot citations. These citations also do not mention the squadron was opposed by any of the 33-39 Zero fighters they encountered which shot down 10 of Lindsey’s 14 aircraft. In the opinion of several retired military officers, Lindsey should have been grounded that day, either by McClusky or the Commanding Officer of the Enterprise. Neither did, nor was this act of supreme bravery considered by his chain of command when they proposed and documented his award. I am sure that if you asked any Naval Aviator who has either crashed his aircraft or ejected from his aircraft and sustained similar injuries, none would have been able to, or been allowed to, climb into another aircraft seven days later, much less launch into combat! I consider Lindsey’s actions to be well above the call of duty
and this information new, substantive, and materially relevant evidence.
Tom Rychlik
As a side note to reinforce RAdm Max Leslie's comments about how he found the Japanese carriers it is interesting to note that by the time Fletcher finally gave the order to launch a strike, Yorktown was quite a bit northwest of TF 16, but not that much further northwest than when TF 16 launched strikes earlier in the morning. The contact from the morning was the only thing Fletcher had on the location of the Japanese fleet. If one notes the launch positions of TF 17 and TF 16 and makes a straight line to the morning sighting report one can see how Yorktown's strike aimed almost directly at the morning sighting report intersects with where the Japanese fleet was after they recovered the Midway strike and turned north. The Enterprise dive bombers as stated were led to a point where the Japanses fleet could possibly be given they continued on their way to Midway and that was somewhat south of the morning sighting report. Leslie and Yorktown got lucky in that their intended flight
plan was a perfect interception course. So from Leslie's perspective his comment, "They gave me a heading and I flew straight to it, and there was the Jap fleet." is more or less accurate. The fact that he might have deviated slightly after spotting the smoke is noteworthy but does not detract from his statement.
6 December 2023 From Mark Horan
In this last edition, in the discussion concerning the award of a Medal of Honor for McClusky, asked what did Theodore Roosevelt do in Cuba to get the Medal of Honor? Per the records, Theodore Roosevelt was the ONLY Brigade commander or above in the American forces engaged that participated in the "attack on the San Juan Heights" to do so MOUNTED. There was long standing animus between the powers that be in the Army ans several highly ranked congressmen. In 1898 the policy for issuing the Medal of Honor was ENTIRELY up to the self-absorbed members of Congress. During the Civil War numerous officers took "enemy colors" from soldiers that had captured them and as they were passed through the officer chain of command, some yahoo who had never even been under fire during the action gave the colors to his congressman and shortly after Congress voted a Medal of Honor for that officer's valor when, in fact, he had never even been under enemy fire!
When Roosevelt was nominated for the MoH when it reached the highest level of the Army a "gentleman" who had a longstanding animus for Roosevelt from his time a Secretary of the Navy quashed it because he had - quote - "Only done what a Commanding officer was expected to do." Roosevelt accepted the decision without further comment - until he fortuitously became President. At that time, having seen first hand how the issuance of such awards, using his authority as President, He changed the rules for such issuance in the future - since his medal had been expressly refused because what was done in the something that was "just" in the line of duty and not "Above and Beyond the Call of Duty", HENCEFORTH the Medal of Honor would, and could, ONLY be awarded for actions deemed Above and Beyond the Call of Duty. Having issued that new dictum, he NEVER publicly commended on not receiving the medal. HE was ONLY awarded his medal posthumously at a much later time when it as OBVIOUS to ANY SANE
and INTELLIGENT person that what he had done in 1898 was entirely in keeping for earning the medal .. even though it was awarded multiple times for such cases ... most notably to U.S. Army Master Sergeant Roy Perez Benavidez by President Ronald Regan more than two decades after fighting an eight hour action - basically alone - against elements of a Battalion of NVA troops that had ambushed a Special Forces A-Team in Vietnam.
Did Roosevelt DESERVE a Medal of Honor for LEADING and attack - MOUNTED - of fortified troops on the San Juan Heights ... followed almost IMMEDIATELY by a further assault after being forced to dismount. In my opinion he assuredly did. Is McClusky's decision on navigation even close to the the same kind of valor "Above and Beyond the Call of Duty" - Are you serious - NO WAY IN HELL!!!
He made an intelligent and carefully thought out decision on the course he should fly based on knowledge he obtained after the launch sequence was complete. and fortunately, he found the enemy. - which was why he was CEAG an strike leader that day. He clearly took no exceptional risk - after all he found, attacked, cleared the enemy, and navigated back to he ship with no more issue than on any other flight. I KNOW because I carried on a written correspondence with him in 1966-67 after I purchased the Avalaon Hill war game "Midway" in 1966. He wrote the introduction ... I wrote to him via the game company and I got answers back from him - which led to me eventually doing all the research used to Coauthor the book "A Glorious Page in Our History" - in particularly writing virtually all the portions of the book where the USN, USMC, and USA pilot's and crewmen's actions were spelled out - which was only possible thanks to Walter Lord most graciously sharing all of his correspondence with
me - the key being the one letter that he had received from a pilot - McCarthy - who had died only months after writing to Lord - and which were instrumental to identifying the men flying with Lieutenant Charles Rollins Ware as he tried to (bring) them all home after the attack.
Mark E. Horan
Co-Author of "A Glorious Page in Our History"
Sinking of the Hiryu
9 December 2023 From Stefano Pagiola
I thought this diorama of a model recently shown at the IPMS Nationals, would be of interest to Roundtable readers.
The picture was posted on Facebook at:
Link to Facebook post.
Thank you. However it has a significant error. The rear seat man is facing aft with the twin 30's deployed. This is wrong for several reasons. First his job was to stow the guns, turn around, and read the altimeter and call out the altitude for the pilot. Since the pilot was using the 3 power scope aiming sight he could not pay attention to his altimeter and thus the altitude he was at. Looking at his target through the 3 power scope made the judgement of altitude a bit difficult. Second, the twin 30's were heavy. If he left them deployed the movement of the dive bomber in a dive would swing them around probably killing him. And third it was just not feasible to fire the guns at any possible target anyway as the dive bomber was in a very steep dive and with the dive brakes not moving very fast. Fighters had a problem slowing down enough to actually get a good shot at it even if it managed to make a pass.
I do love the work and detail that went into this diorama and respect how much work goes into these models having built many when I was younger.
-TW
11 December 2023
From Stefano Pagiola
Good points all. And just as we point out the errors in movies such as Midway, we should point out errors in models such as this one. With your permission, I’d like to post your comments as a reply to the FB post. It’s not clear if the poster is also the modeler, or If he’s posting a pic he took of someone else’s model, but hopefully the feedback will reach the modeler.
Condition of Yorktown at Midway
17 December 2023 From Dave Anderer
We all know of the damage to Yorktown at Coral Sea and the hurried repairs before Midway. I’d like to learn a little more about her condition before departing Pearl for Midway.
I recently encountered a claim that one thing that Pearl didn’t repair were the superheaters, thus limiting her top speed. The claim is at:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H98UkOQtG0Y&t=440s
However, looking at the Buckmaster’s action report for Midway I see:
“Steaming at full power, 30.5 knots, 284 r.p.m., with main steam line cross connection valves closed in superheater firerooms; the engineering plant in battle operating status, standing by for air attack.”
The war damage report for Midway says that after the first attack:
“Together with superheat boilers 7, 8 and 9, which had not been damaged, there were then 6 boilers, 3 saturated and 3 superheat, on the line about one hour and twenty minutes after the attack.”
So it sure seems to me some (all?) superheaters were available for Midway. An unsourced claim that after Coral Sea:
“The superheater boiler system would be repaired with new, factory parts.”
But there are other rabbit holes to go down such as:
“Indeed, it has been argued that Yorktown (CV-5) might not have been lost at the Battle of Midway because the ship's three separate superheat boilers remained in commission after earlier attack but could not propel the ship without receipt of saturated steam from the ship's other boilers, which were incapacitated.”
What are the ‘best’ (a loaded term) sources or consensus on the condition of the ship overall and specifically her engineering plant at Midway?
Question about the Patches to Yorktown at Midway
25 December 2023 From Jamie
I am building a scale model to the Yorktown at the time just before I-168 struck the final blows, and am curious about the nature of the repairs/patches undertaken to the vessel after the initial dive bomber attack.
I understand that three bombs landed, one opening a large hole in the deck, and that repairs allowed the flight deck to become operational again. My question is about what shape those repairs took. I have seen a photo of the hole, with a damage control party applying what seem to be wooden structure to support some patch they would add later, but I don’t know what form that patch would take. Was it simply something like a big piece of steel welded over the hole? Or was it something more elaborate?
Apologies for the long message.
Kind Regards,
Jamie.
The Yorktown flight deck was teak wood over a metal frame. You can see the twisted metal strip towards the front of the bomb damage. There was no armor or sheet of metal beneath the wooden planks. This made repairing the damaged flight deck relatively quickly as observed when Yorktown was hit with three bombs. Two penetrated the flight deck leaving a small hole but the one in the picture below exploded on contact thus tearing up the deck. The wooden planks you see in the picture would eventually be cut to place over the hole after the original damaged wooden planks were cut away. Crewman with the axe doing just that. One plank is over the hole as a kind of guide to see how long the other planks would have to be cut to patch the hole. So the original planks were replaced with the ones you see in the picture and the deck at least for the near future was usable again.
Hope this helps.
-TW
1 January 2024 From Jamie
Thank you very much for the info! I have another small question which has just occurred to me: what colour were the guns (the 1.1 inchers, 5 inchers and such) painted - if at all? Was it just the hull colour - Haze Grey - or were they painted some other shade? Hope you’ve had a good Christmas and New Year! Kind Regards,
Jamie
I believe the gun barrels themselves were not painted but rather stained or had some kind of bluing. There was a process called Parkerizing that was developed by Parker Brothers Metal Finishing Company and was used by the military during WW2 although I'm not sure it was used on Naval AA weapons. If you want to see original color film of the carriers in action watch this youtube video. It shows the color of the guns at about the 10 minute mark. I don't think the film of the gun crews were actually taken at Midway but rather probably during training. A lot of color film was shot on Hornet before and during the battle. Hornet never engaged any Japanese strike aircraft so I think the gun action is just practice intermixed with other battle footage and quite possibly not even from Hornet as I believe the footage shows 40mm rather than 1.1's so was probably shot on an Essex class carrier later in the war. But you can clearly see the color of the gun
barrels.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MW8tQ_6dqS8&t=3s&ab_channel=ZenosWarbirds
-TW
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