Battle of Midway RoundTable

The Battle of Midway Roundtable

CARRIER AIR GROUPS AT MIDWAY

by Ronald W. Russell

30 July 2009

With the crystal-clear view of hindsight, it’s easy to wonder in amazement why all of the U.S. carrier squadrons that sighted the Japanese carrier force (“Kido Butai”) on the morning of 4 June 1942 failed to radio a concise enemy contact report (bearing, ship types, course, speed) back to Task Force 16 and 17. Today we think that to be an obvious, primary requirement for any aircrew that sights an enemy fleet. Yet, with the sole exception of VF-6 commander James Gray (and belatedly in his case), no TF 16/17 squadron made anything like a contact report as the carrier battle commenced.

Roundtable member William Shields, a retired USAF brigadier general and former fighter pilot, recently brought this matter to my attention as something that struck him as an incomprehensible anomaly. He asked if the issue had previously been reviewed on the Roundtable, and if so, what possible explanation could there be?

I gave him an answer off the top of my head, but forwarded his inquiry to a few of our notable historians for anything they might be able to add. What ensued turned out to be an excellent example of how some of the previously obscure or misunderstood details of the BOM are typically explored, analyzed, and brought to clarity on the Roundtable, usually to a degree not seen anywhere else, if at all.

To show how that happens, I’ve attached the message thread below, with the commentary from Gen. Shields, myself, and Roundtable authors Mark Horan and John Lundstrom inserted where appropriate. For anyone who may not be aware, Mark is a coauthor of A Glorious Page In Our History, and John is probably best known here for his two The First Team books plus Black Shoe Carrier Admiral.

The writers are identified as:

WS = William Shields

RR = Ronald Russell, Roundtable editor

MH = Mark Horan

JL = John Lundstrom

- - - - -

WS:

Taking advantage of the Roundtable's tolerance for possibly old (and possibly dumb) questions, I would like to ask this one:

"What did the other HAG [Hornet Air Group] airmen know about the VT-8 engagement with Kido Butai, when did they know it, and what did they do about it?"

At the time of Waldron's contact report to Ring, there were some 78 other HAG airmen airborne within perhaps 80 miles of the action. Presumably they were monitoring a common frequency.

RR:

Presumably covers it well. Keep in mind that this is 1942. The radio technology employed dates from the 1930s, and it wasn't all that reliable. They used the low end of the HF band, around 2 to 6 MHz for voice radio, which had a dismally short range under those conditions. Long range contact was by CW (Morse code), which was only done by the radiomen-gunners in the VSB & VT squadrons, when they weren't engaged by Zeros. Most pilots and radioman reported hearing nothing of the Waldron-Ring exchange at about 0830, and fewer still heard anything from Waldron thereafter.

MH:

Actually, the presumption is incorrect. Each of the four [HAG] squadrons, plus CHAG [air group commander Stanhope Ring] were given a unique command frequency. This left the fighters on their own circuit, with no way to converse with any of the strike planes unless they changed frequency. Of course, the strike planes that equipped the attack squadrons were multi-place planes with a radioman as part of the crew. Those radiomen could change frequency to allow contact with any of the other squadrons. Customarily, such inter-squadron communication was done by the CO, though the division leaders might find it necessary to do so as well. However, it was not uncommon for a crew to decide to switch frequencies to monitor communications. It is worth noting that at least two radioman-gunners and a couple of pilots in wing planes specifically stated that they did monitor (change) frequencies and that is why they heard [certain radio calls] when others did not.

WS:

All of them knew that detection and location of the Japanese fleet was crucial to their mission. It would seem that those airmen had an inherent duty to ensure that contact with the enemy was immediately reported, so that CHAG's formation could attack and the task force commanders could be updated on the tactical situation.

RR:

I think the problem is the state of carrier doctrine in that early era. By the end of the war, radio equipment and communications doctrine were well refined, but in June 1942 neither was the case. One would certainly think today that getting a contact report back to TF 16/17 upon first sight of enemy CVs would be a no-brainer, but the doctrine of today or even 1945 didn't exist in 1942. If you read some of the squadron after-action reports on our web site, there are recommendations that new communications procedures be implemented; basic things that we now take for granted. The fact that they show up in AARs is indicative that they didn't exist during the battle.

MH:

The above comment says it all. The doctrine at the time stressed radio silence. That almost everyone decided to break radio silence for one reason or another (VT-8, VT-6, VF-6, VSB-6, VB-3, and VT-3 assuredly did), they did so relative to some form of attack coordination—no one ever thought of doing so to make a proper contact report. Of course, prior to 4 June, our carrier planes had always found the enemy. The results on 4 June were largely responsible for new doctrine bring implemented in the Solomons.

JL:

Contact reports by strike planes as opposed to search planes were unusual in the USN system at that time; witness their lack at Coral Sea, too. As Mark said, such messages that the U.S. CVs intercepted were concerned with coordinating the various elements of the strike group. If Waldron sent a contact report per se, the U.S. CVs did not receive it.

WS:

Several authors state that individuals in CHAG's formation were aware of the VT-8 engagement. Mrazek [A Dawn Like Thunder] (pages 134, 135, 137) says that Waldron's contact report to Ring was heard clearly by gunner Quillen, who listened to further Waldron transmissions as the VT-8 attack developed.

RR:

On p. 134 Mrazek is quoting from George Gay, who certainly could have heard Waldron's voice radio calls since he was within sight of him. On page 135 he seems to infer that Quillen also heard Waldron try to call Ring, but there is no such quote from Quillen in the record. Quillen's statement is contained in enclosure H of Captain Mitscher's official Hornet after-action report, and it only cites certain calls Quillen heard from Waldron when Waldron was talking to his own pilots. Mrazek gets that right on p. 137.

WS:

Mrazek (p.138) says that [VB-8 commander] Johnson got word of the Waldron messages and turned VB-8 toward the Japanese fleet, and (p. 152) that Johnson looked for the Japanese fleet for an hour after hearing Waldron's last message.

RR:

Interestingly, Mrazek also cites Roy Gee at length on p. 138, but Gee (one of our Roundtable members) will tell you that he heard nothing on the radio during the entire flight, and he was in the same formation with Johnson. Not to debate what Johnson claimed; it just illustrates the above issue about primitive radio technology. When Johnson made his turn to the southeast, Gee thought they were just heading toward Midway due to low fuel, which is what ultimately happened.

JL:

As Mark notes, Johnson turned VB-8 south because he heard messages from Waldron's attack and knew at least some of the enemy must be to the south. Bowen Weisheit erroneously thought VB-8 flew west all the way out to the final turn around point 225 miles out, but Johnson broke away well before that. He headed south parallel to the reported track of the supposed lead group of IJN CVs, didn't find them (he must have passed just to the west of Nagumo!) and finally headed for Midway.

WS:

Lundstrom (The First Team, 2nd edition, p. 347) says that some VB-8 airmen heard snippets of Waldron's radio calls. Cressman, et. al. [A Glorious Page In Our History], page 95, says that Ring heard Waldron's message about 0920, and that Johnson then turned toward the last known Japanese position.

RR:

I don't know what Cressman is quoting in this case. I could find no evidence of any such claim in the Hornet AAR nor in Ring's latter-day "Lost Letter."

MH:

Actually, it was “et. al.” (me) that wrote those passages, and the references are to folks who were interviewed [that had been] monitoring frequencies other than their own.

WS:

Parshall & Tully [Shattered Sword] (p. 272) say that Hornet SBDs received Waldron's announcement that he was under attack, and that thereupon Johnson plotted a course to find the Japanese fleet. The authors cite a 2004 communication from Mark Horan as a source for their analysis of Hornet aircraft movements.

RR:

This likely is another reference to Quillen. If fits the description P & T have given here.

WS:

If these reports are true, why did HAG airmen who knew of Waldron's report not sound an alarm, relay the report, and enter the battle?

RR:

Again, I believe it's the doctrine (or lack thereof) that existed at the time. Seems so obvious to us, but we weren't there. Also, and most important, the text of Waldron’s known radio transmissions says nothing about Kido Butai’s location. The rest of the HAG had scant knowledge of where VT-8 had gone; only that they had deviated from the prescribed course about a half hour after launch—and few of the VSB pilots and gunners had even seen that. So Waldron’s chatter to his pilots would have given Ring and the VSB squadrons little or nothing to go on in order to enter the battle.

MH:

You need to study all the references to CHAG and his rigid approaches to discipline. No junior pilot in the HAG would willingly run foul of him. Besides, it wasn't their call. It was up to the squadron COs, who I am sure they assumed were already on the command frequency and hearing exactly what they were hearing.

WS:

The issue of radio silence is often mentioned by BOM authors...

RR:

The context there generally refers to radio silence from shipboard transmitters. It also applied to aircraft until they had found the enemy.

WS:

...but It is not logical that HAG airmen who had heard and understood Waldron's message would have been inhibited by radio silence doctrine. They would have known that the enemy was engaged and the battle was on, making radio silence moot, if not counterproductive.

RR:

Not really. Quillen, et al who heard Waldron had no knowledge as to where VT-8 was, and therefore where the enemy was. So no enemy contact report was warranted at that time or even possible, except by VT-8. Radio transmissions from the Hornet VSBs at that point would only have clued the enemy that another strike was inbound from a new direction.

MH:

More accurately, all of radioman and more than a few of the pilots had no idea the mission was in trouble. Their job was to follow the CO. The real question is, did they know at that time [when VT-8 commenced its attack] that they were not “on course, on time?" The only ones who for sure knew the answer to that were Ring, Johnson, and [VS-8 commander] Rodee. Ring chose to do nothing, Johnson waited while he checked his navigation and then took action when none was apparently forthcoming, and Rodee, who likely was ready to do what Johnson did, received direct orders from Ring to follow him, which is what he did because he surely wasn't going to disobey a direct order from CHAG!

WS:

There were a number of cases that day of breaking radio silence when a battle was developing, including Waldron, McClusky, Gray (VF-6, belatedly) and, that afternoon, Adams (VS-5). Why not HAG?

MH:

Adams was on a search mission. Doctrine expressly told him to radio his contact report. CHAG was a rigid, by the book, arrogant, no nonsense leader with no experience in combat. For him, doctrine was everything. No enemy in sight—no broadcasting! The others, with the exception of Waldron, were all far more experienced combat pilots, or, in the case of the three Yorktown/Saratoga squadrons, well trained in wartime tactics based on the combat experience they had obtained.

RR:

Even Gray's belated contact report was so indistinct that TF 16/17 didn't have a solid grasp on where he (and the enemy) was.

JL:

Gray's two messages were thought by the Enterprise to have come from McClusky [leading VB6 and VS6 toward Akagi and Kaga]; hence Browning's anguished order to attack!

RR:

The first solid report came from VF3 CO Thach when he landed on Yorktown and sprinted up to the flag bridge to tell Fletcher in person.

JL:

One important correction is that Thach never briefed Fletcher as to the destruction of the three Japanese carriers. He never had the chance to do so. The first attack on the Yorktown came in too quickly after he landed, and things turned chaotic. No one told Fletcher the morning strike had knocked out three carriers. This is more of Morison's faulty deductions. See Black Shoe Carrier Admiral, p. 570, note 3. Thach even wrote Morison in 1949 (letter in Morison's Office Files) to correct the error, but Morison never bothered to alter his text. It's necessary to know this to understand Fletcher's decisions later that afternoon. So far as he knew, no more than one or possibly two Japanese carriers had been hit.

[Editor’s note: John’s contribution here is significant, for it even corrects a BOM primary source that I was referring to when I mentioned Thach sprinting to Yorktown’s flag bridge to report to Fletcher. That came from VF-3 pilot Tom Cheek’s memoir (see No Right to Win , p. 106). According to Cheek, Thach actually hadn’t seen the three Japanese carriers burning since his fight with Zeros was at a higher altitude than Cheek’s, who was down low with VT-3. After Cheek landed, Thach asked him what he had seen and it was Cheek who told him about three burning Japanese CVs. But as Lundstrom explains in his cited Black Shoe note, it turns out that Thach then made his report to Yorktown air officer CDR Murr Arnold, who apparently had no chance to pass the word to Fletcher during the chaos of the Japanese air attack.]

WS:

Here is a dilemma. Reading the information noted here, a student of the BOM is left with two unattractive choices: either the reports that some HAG airmen heard and understood Waldron's contact message are wrong, or those airmen failed in a duty to relay the message so that HAG and other forces could join the battle.

MH:

As indicate above, this is not true, especially the latter as it was never doctrine for junior pilots to second-guess their leaders in combat!

RR:

Or, thirdly, they didn't do what we expect of them today because their then-extant knowledge, training, experience, equipment, and doctrine didn't compel or allow them to do anything more than they did.

WS:

The dilemma is most troubling in the case of Ring. A statement that he knew of Waldron's contact with the enemy and flew on, away from the battle, is equivalent to an accusation of dereliction of duty.

RR:

Although there are several things one can nail Ring for in the BOM, I don't think this one sticks because he didn't know where Waldron was when he (allegedly) heard him at 0920, and therefore he didn't know where the enemy was. He did make a turn at about that time, ostensibly toward the enemy, but if Weisheit is right, his turn was actually toward the Hornet.

JL:

The definitive account of the USN at Midway has yet to be written. There's a lot more out there that needs examination.

RR:

And that’s what keep the Battle of Midway Roundtable going!

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